I Hate Paypal

So I received a few interesting responses from readers to my post on Justice Scalia’s silly footnote in City of Arlington v. FCC.  First, Jacob Gershman over on wsj.com writes:

To be fair, though, it’s not exactly obvious what CTIA stands for. Yes, the group was originally called the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association. But before changing its name to CTIA-The Wireless Association in 2004, it was called the Cellular Telecommunications Internet Association.  So it’s a bit unclear whether the “I” stands for “Industry” or “Internet.”

Isn’t it unethical for a judge or his staff to engage in research (beyond the record) about parties (as opposed to the law)? And would not that extend to their names (where the record does not clarify their names)?

Hmm … I hadn’t thought of that angle, to be honest; but this is hardly a case that raises any real ethical concerns, I wouldn’t think.  I would not think that it would be inappropriate for a Justice to consult a dictionary, or a book on English grammar, before submitting an opinon; nor is it inappropriate to take “judicial notice” of everyday events.  I would think a judge could write, in a case in which, say, Time-Warner Inc. was a party, something about the large office building T-W owns at Columbus Circle in New York, even if that fact were not in the official record of the case.  If the party’s name bore the SLIGHTEST significance for the case, I might agree that there’s a line to be drawn – but this was entirely gratuitous on Scalia’s part; HE raised the “issue,” and I think it’s incumbent upon him to check his facts so that he doesn’t end up looking like a bit of a dope.

Facts about language, the law, and the world (untethered to the specific facts giving rise to the litigation) — all these a judge might (and should) research beyond the record. But here — in this Supreme Court case — the fact is about a party to the litigation. It is the party’s name. I do not think a judge can look beyond the record because the parties already have an obligation to list their names on the docket (and in the pleadings) and if the parties are not forthcoming in regard to their own name, then the filing can be contested by their adversaries.Indeed, I have seen judges throw cases out sua sponte where a party tried to bring litigation under an assumed name or anonymously (absent putting forward facts supporting good cause). Scalia has a right to expect that by the time litigation reaches him, the record will already clearly reflect the names of the parties. If it does not, then something is really wrong with the system.

Imagine if a civil action goes to final judgment, and then after a monetary award is granted to the prevailing party, the non-prevailing party states that an affiliate or subsidiary with a similar name was the (judgment proof) defendant and the parent refuses to pay up. Then you need a whole collateral case to determine who was the non-prevailing party in the first action. That’s just not on; the system cannot work that way. Litigation must end. We have to know who the parties are before the court during the actual litigation and not discover that important fact afterwards in follow up litigation.

Your characterizing a party’s name as not connected to the facts giving rise to the case may be true. But who you sue or fail to sue is a strategic decision (and it may be a strategic failure). A party might not clarify its name or its status (corp, llp, llc, etc) for strategic reasons — and Scalia cannot on his own figure out who the party is before him based on … what his clerks find on the internet. I practiced in Delaware for a few years and I cannot remember any case where a court of record clarified the status of a party by requesting official documents from Delaware records or archives or maintained by the Secretary of State’s office (which maintains info on whether a business entity is in good standing). All that must be put forward by the parties.

It was the lawyers and the lower courts which seriously failed here.
In my view, Scalia’s comments were far too kind.

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The Supreme Court has decided that a convicted murderer cannot be executed unless he has a rational understanding of the fact that he is going to be put to death and of the reason for his execution. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954–60 (2007). In announcing that rule, however, the Court did not decide what rational understanding means in this context. It acknowledged that a concept like rational understanding is difficult to define and cautioned that normal or rational in this context does not mean what a layperson understands those terms to mean….

The habeas petitioner in our case, John Ferguson, contends that under the Panetti decision he is mentally incompetent to be executed. As the facts come to us, Ferguson has a mental illness but he does understand that he is going to die by execution, and he understands that it is going to happen because he committed eight murders. Ferguson also believes, as tens of millions if not hundreds of millions of other people do, that there is life after death. Countless people also believe, as he does, that they are among God’s chosen people. But Ferguson’s religious belief is more grandiose than that because he believes that he is the Prince of God….

One could argue, as Ferguson’s attorneys do, that his belief that he will be resurrected as the Prince of God negates a rational understanding that he will be killed and thereby establishes that he is not mentally competent to be executed. That cannot be correct. Panetti cannot mean that a belief in resurrection or other forms of life after death is inconsistent with the rational understanding of death that is required for mental competence to be executed. If it did mean that, most Americans would be mentally incompetent to be executed.

While Ferguson’s thoughts about what happens after death may seem extreme to many people, nearly every major world religion — from Christianity to Zoroastrianism — envisions some kind of continuation of life after death, often including resurrection. Ferguson’s belief in his ultimate corporeal resurrection may differ in degree, but it does not necessarily differ in kind, from the beliefs of millions of Americans. [Details, including a canvass of many religions throughout the world, omitted. -EV] …

A conclusion that a particular belief about the afterlife and one’s role in it is extreme enough to be irrational, delusional, and indicative of incompetence to be executed is only a few steps away from the same conclusion about any person who believes in resurrection, in heaven or hell, or in any variation of life after death. Courts should be reluctant to treat as a symptom of mental illness anyone’s belief about what will happen to him after he dies. It is beyond the ken of courts to measure the rationality of religious beliefs –– what will happen to us after we pass through the dark curtain of death is the ultimate non-justiciable question.

Because the state courts’ determination that Ferguson possesses a rational understanding of his execution and the reason for it is not so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement, AEDPA precludes us from disturbing their judgment.

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